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INTRODUCTION
Trust is a focal construct in buyer–supplier exchanges, yet prior literature has not paid 
adequate attention to its asymmetric nature (De Jong & Dirks, 2012; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). 
Because trust is dyadic, buyers and suppliers often develop different trust perceptions of their 
partners, and asymmetric trust thus is a reality in interfirm exchanges (Svensson, 2006). Most
empirical studies overlook this asymmetry though (Graebner, 2009; Poppo, Zhou, & Li, 2016), 
instead relying on unilateral trust, such as buyer trust (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) or supplier trust (Dyer
& Chu, 2000; Sako & Helper, 1998) to assess interfirm trust. Under-developed is how asymmetric 
trust affects exchange outcomes in interfirm exchanges.
Furthermore, trust is subject to boundary conditions; although prior work recognizes that its 
performance impact depends on transactional characteristics, extant empirical findings are mixed
(Poppo et al., 2016). For example, using buyer-side perceptions, Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger (2008)
show that the positive impact of trust-based relational governance on exchange performance is
weaker at high levels of asset specificity. In contrast, using supplier-side trust perceptions, Aulakh, 
Kotabe, and Sahay (1996) reveal that the potential opportunism involved in high asset specificity 
makes the role of trust more important for safeguarding transactions. 
These inconclusive findings might result from a failure to take trust asymmetry into 
consideration. Therefore, we distinguish two aspects of interfirm trust: joint trust and trust 
asymmetry. We accordingly examine how joint trust and buyer trust asymmetry affect exchange 
performance differentially, while also assessing the contingent roles of transactional attributes: 
asset specificity (AS) and supply market uncertainty.
This study contributes to existing research in several ways. First, we empirically examine 
trust asymmetry in buyer–supplier relationships, responding to a long-standing call in trust 
literature (Zaheer & Harris, 2005). By differentiating buyers’ and suppliers’ roles, our 
consideration of trust asymmetry helps explain why interfirm trust does not work in some cases
(Dyer & Chu, 2003; Zaheer & Harris, 2005). Second, we reveal that joint trust and buyer trust 
asymmetry perform differentially across different levels of transactional attributes, and help explain 
prior inconsistency (Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006; Poppo et al., 2008). Overall, we 
contribute to extant trust research by highlighting the bilateral and asymmetric nature of trust.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Trust asymmetry and joint trust
10.5465/AMBPP.2017.57
Relational exchange theory emphasizes that social relations play a critical role in economic 
exchanges, because all exchanges are embedded in social environments (Macneil, 1980). One of 
the most fundamental social relations is trust, or a belief in the exchange partner’s reliability, 
benevolence, and integrity (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Trust breeds positive beliefs about 
collective interests, encourages exchange parties to share information and resources, allows for 
flexibility in coordinating, leading to better performance (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Most extant 
literature, however, uses unilateral trust to represent interfirm trust but overlooks the potential 
divergence between exchange parties (Graebner, 2009). Thus, we consider two facets of interfirm 
trust simultaneously: joint trust and trust asymmetry (De Jong & Dirks, 2012). Joint trust refers to 
the overall strength of the trusting relationship (i.e., buyer trust plus supplier trust); trust asymmetry
reflects the gap between exchange partners in their trust perceptions (De Jong & Dirks, 2012). In 
this study, we focus on buyer trust asymmetry (i.e., buyer trust minus supplier trust), because in 
modern markets, buyers usually initiate and lead transactions (Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). 
Transactional attributes
The effect of trust is conditional on transactional attributes (Poppo et al., 2016). According
to transaction cost economics, asset specificity and market uncertainty are two salient attributes that 
increase transaction costs and exchange hazards (David & Han, 2004; Williamson, 1985). Asset 
specificity (AS) refers to unique, non-redeployable transaction investments in the relationship 
(Williamson, 1985). Both buyers and suppliers can make specific investments, so we consider both 
joint AS and buyer AS asymmetry. Joint AS is the sum of transaction-specific assets contributed by 
both buyers and suppliers to the relationship (Bercovitz, Jap, & Nickerson, 2006). Buyer AS
asymmetry measures buyer-specific assets minus supplier-specific assets. Market uncertainty refers 
to the degree of unanticipated changes in external environments surrounding the exchange
(Williamson, 1985). It increases transactional risk and coordination costs, leading to an adaption 
problem (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Following prior studies in buyer–supplier exchanges (e.g., 
Cannon & Perreault, 1999), we focus on supply market uncertainty, which assesses the fluctuations 
of pricing, product features, and product amounts in the supply market. 
HYPOTHESES
Direct effects of joint trust and trust asymmetry
The positive effect of mutual trust on exchange performance is well documented in existing 
literature (Zaheer et al., 1998). Joint trust makes exchange parties more willing to share
confidential information and critical resources within the relationship, due to their low perceived 
risk (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Information sharing helps partners resolve potential problems and 
accomplish their goals efficiently (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Furthermore, with high mutual trust, the 
business partners hold shared positive expectations about the relationship’s continuity (Doney &
Cannon, 1997). This makes partners show more flexibility and make mutual adaptations to 
coordinate, which reduces transactional conflicts and fosters performance (Dyer & Chu, 2003).
Hypothesis 1a: Joint trust is positively associated with exchange performance. 
When buyers hold more trust than suppliers, the asymmetry may lead to negative outcomes. 
First, less-trusting suppliers commit less to the relationship. Information about component quality, 
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specifications, and costs is critical for buyers to plan their own production, but such confidential 
information is owned exclusively by suppliers (Sako & Helper, 1998). Without these details, 
buyers cannot identify potential issues or ensure that their final products will match well with the 
supplied components. Thus, the information asymmetry is detrimental to exchange performance. 
Second, there is more scope for suppliers to engage in opportunism. To constrain opportunism, 
buyers often monitor their partner’s behaviors and output (Heide & Wathne, 2006), but if the 
buyers are trusting more, they promise more flexibility and spend less time monitoring (Dyer &
Chu, 2003), which creates space for the suppliers to behave opportunistically (e.g., deliver low-
quality products). If suppliers provide products with hidden defects, it is both costly and unrealistic 
for buyers that lack specific component knowledge to identify.
In contrast, if suppliers trust more, they likely provide important component information
(Dyer & Chu, 2003), which enables buyers to plan and adapt better. Also, trusting suppliers are 
willing to accomplish their production tasks well, which is critical to exchange success (Whipple &
Roh, 2010). In such conditions, buyers may express less trust, but they still must provide specific 
information to suppliers to accomplish their tasks. Also, compared with supplier opportunism, 
buyer opportunism (e.g., payment delays) is easier to identify (Joshi & Arnold, 1997). Accordingly, 
suppliers’ higher trust has a limited effect on buyers’ motivation to behave opportunistically. 
Hypothesis 1b: Buyer trust asymmetry is negatively associated with exchange performance.
Moderating effects of transactional attributes
Joint asset specificity. Joint AS, or the degree of mutual customized exchanges, indicates
interdependent sunk costs (Williamson, 1985). When partners make highly specialized investments, 
they must share extensive information to ensure efficient coordination (Narayanan, Narasimhan, &
Schoenherr, 2015). By promoting bilateral sharing, joint trust enables partners to exploit their
specialized assets fully and enhances performance. Moreover, the flexibility created by joint trust 
becomes more important in highly specified exchanges. High joint AS requires partners to work 
closely to utilize such specialized investments, which increases the need for continuous adaptations 
and flexibility (Poppo et al., 2016). By indicating that partners will not appropriate efforts, joint 
trust facilitates flexible adaptation and integrated collaboration (Zhou & Poppo, 2010), which help
exchange partners realize the value of their specific investments. 
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between joint trust and exchange performance is more 
positive when joint AS is high than when it is low. 
The supplier, which controls the production process and component quality, must engage in 
active information sharing to leverage specialized resources and achieve mutual gains (Mesquita &
Brush, 2008). If suppliers trust less, they are unlikely to engage in such active information sharing, 
which creates significant barriers to improve the exchange through idiosyncratic investments (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). As a result, buyer trust asymmetry likely leads to the misuse of mutual investments. 
Moreover, joint AS makes the threat of supplier opportunism more evident. Because suppliers
control production, their role is especially critical for using the specialized assets to generate value
(Buvik & Reve, 2001). If buyers trust less, they pay more attention to ensure that suppliers do not 
shirk; if suppliers trust more, they share information and perform well. However, if suppliers trust 
less, they likely misappropriate the considerable specialized investments in high joint AS settings.
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Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between buyer trust asymmetry and exchange performance
is more negative when joint AS is high than when it is low. 
Buyer asset specificity asymmetry. When buyers invest more specialized assets, they tailor 
their operations or product designs to the suppliers’ components or routines (Buvik & Reve, 2001). 
Detailed information about supplier components then is critical to help buyers make these matches 
and facilitate their production (Narayanan et al., 2015). Joint trust is especially helpful for
promoting the supplier’s information sharing and supporting buyers’ efforts to arrange their own 
production. Moreover, when buyer AS asymmetry is high, buyers face high sunk costs that limit 
their ability to switch suppliers (Mesquita & Brush, 2008). Because joint trust provides exchange 
parties with shared identities and beliefs about their collective interests, it transforms buyer AS
asymmetry into a credible commitment, rather than an exploitation opportunity for suppliers
(Poppo et al., 2016; Zaheer et al., 1998). Then the exchange partners can make good use of their
specialized assets to reduce exchange costs and promote exchange performance. 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between joint trust and exchange performance is more 
positive when buyer AS asymmetry is high than when it is low. 
High buyer AS asymmetry intensifies the negative relationship between buyer trust 
asymmetry and exchange performance. First, with high buyer AS asymmetry, buyers would offer
more specific information with their relatively higher investments, exacerbating the information 
gap between buyers and suppliers. With limited information from suppliers, buyers cannot match 
their investment with the supplied components or arrange their own operation (Mesquita & Brush, 
2008). Second, high buyer AS asymmetry encourages less-trusting suppliers to pursue their self-
interest, with higher returns and lower risk. The trusting buyers have higher sunk costs, so it would 
be difficult for them to punish the suppliers or terminate the relationship (Stump & Heide, 1996). 
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between buyer trust asymmetry and exchange performance 
is more negative when buyer AS asymmetry is high than when it is low. 
Supply market uncertainty. Under high supply market uncertainty, joint trust becomes more 
important for promoting exchange performance. When they face greater uncertainty, exchange 
parties turn to reliable partners for valid information and resources (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008). 
Joint trust enables them to obtain critical information and exclusive resources from partners, such 
that they can respond better to market changes (Li et al., 2008). Market uncertainty also requires 
exchange partners to make quick, continuous adaptations (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010). If they enjoy 
joint trust, partners make timely adjustments and resolve issues flexibly, such that they react to 
unforeseen changes effectively (Poppo et al., 2016). For example, through integrative coordination,
suppliers can make proper adjustments to their inventory to meet unexpected contingencies. 
Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between joint trust and exchange performance is more 
positive when supply market uncertainty is high than when it is low. 
Buyer trust asymmetry also becomes more detrimental with high supply market uncertainty. 
First, in fluctuating markets, suppliers must provide up-to-date, accurate information for buyers to 
deal effectively with external changes (Nyaga, Whipple, & Lynch, 2010). However, if suppliers 
express less trust, they tend to withhold this information. Without the crucial information, buyers 
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cannot make appropriate adjustments. Second, when supply market uncertainty is high, more-
trusting buyers likely attribute potential problems to the external environment rather than the 
suppliers. Suppliers in turn could exploit this trust to pursue their self-interest and reduce their 
efforts to foster performance (Srinivasan, Mukherjee, & Gaur, 2011). In contrast, when market 
uncertainty is low, there are no alternative excuses, which should help curtail supplier opportunism. 
Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between buyer trust asymmetry and exchange performance is
more negative when supply market uncertainty is high than when it is low. 
METHODS
Sampling and data collection
We gathered dyadic data about buyer–supplier relationships from manufacturing firms in
China. For each firm, we identified a senior purchasing manager in charge of supplier management
as a key informant. We asked each informant to select a primary supplier and assess this specific, 
ongoing relationship. With this referral, we contacted these supplier managers to obtain their 
assessments of the exchange relationships. We collected a usable sample of 432 buyer–supplier 
dyads, for an effective response rate of 36%. To assess the causal link between trust and 
performance, we collected data in two waves. This reduces the potential for endogeneity and
common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). The second wave
results in 250 matched responses. After deleting 15 dyads with missing data, the final sample 
includes 235 matched responses across the two periods (54.4% of the dyads from Wave 1). We 
found no significant differences in firm size, age, or ownership between the samples of two waves. 
Measures
We developed multi-item scales for the focal variables, on the basis of prior research and 
our fieldwork. We assessed buyer trust and supplier trust with three items adapted from Zaheer et 
al. (1998). Joint trust was calculated as the sum of buyer trust and supplier trust. Buyer trust 
asymmetry was measured as buyer trust minus supplier trust. The three items to measure asset 
specificity came from Cannon and Perreault (1999). We obtained these evaluations from both the 
buyer and supplier sides. We then calculated joint AS as the sum of buyer AS plus supplier AS and 
buyer AS asymmetry as buyer AS minus supplier AS. We adapted a scale from Cannon and 
Perreault (1999) to measure supply market uncertainty. This information was collected from 
suppliers. Exchange performance relied on a four-item scale adapted from Bercovitz et al. (2006)
that assesses relationship performance. We calculated the average between the buyer and supplier 
evaluations to indicate exchange performance. 
Because we collected this information in Wave 2, we could test the causal link between 
trust and performance. As control variables, we included exchange duration, procurement 
concentration, buyer/supplier age, buyer/supplier sales, and buyer industry types; these data were 
collected in Wave 1. The information for these control variables mostly came from the buyer side, 
except for firm age and sales, which included both sides. 
We conducted confirmatory factor analysis to assess the fit of our measures (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1988). The model shows a satisfactory fit (chi-square/degrees of freedom=2.68, 
RMSEA=0.08, CFI=0.95, IFI=0.95). Measures also indicate adequate convergent validity and 
reliability (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988), and discriminant validity (Koufteros, 1999). Our longitudinal 
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design and multiple sources limit concerns of common method variance. By collecting data from 
both buyers and suppliers, we also reduce the potential for common method bias due to single-
source information (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Following Slotegraaf, Moorman, and Inman (2003), we adopted a two-stage regression 
analysis to handle this potential endogeneity. The results indicate that joint trust enhances exchange 
performance (b = 0.28, p = 0.00), and buyer trust asymmetry negatively affects it (b = -0.14, p = 
0.03). This support for H1a and H1b. The positive interaction between joint AS and joint trust (b =
0.17, p = 0.01) supports H2a. However, the interaction between joint AS and buyer trust 
asymmetry is not significant (b = -0.11, p = 0.11), so we cannot confirm H2b. The interaction effect 
of joint trust and buyer AS asymmetry is significantly positive (b = 0.14, p = 0.03), in support of 
H3a. Moreover, the interaction of buyer trust asymmetry and buyer AS asymmetry is significantly 
negative (b = -0.12, p = 0.05), which lends support to H3b. Consistent with our prediction in H4a, 
supply market uncertainty positively moderates the effect of joint trust on exchange performance (b 
= 0.14, p = 0.04). Also consistent with H4b, the interaction between buyer trust asymmetry and 
supply market uncertainty is significantly negative (b = -0.20, p = 0.00). 
DISCUSSION
Research implications
We adopt a dyadic view of trust to explicate the different implications of joint trust and 
buyer trust asymmetry for exchange performance. Our study represents important contributions to 
existing trust literature. First, we enrich extant research by undertaking a dyadic analysis that 
uncovers the dark side of trust asymmetry. By distinguishing between joint trust and trust 
asymmetry, we offer new insights into how interfirm trust functions. Compared with buyer trust, 
supplier trust is especially valuable for exchanges, due to the proprietary information that suppliers 
possess and the difficulty associated with identifying supplier opportunism. Our findings show that 
trust asymmetry represents an important determinant of negative exchange performance in buyer–
supplier relationships. 
Second, our study adds nuance to the understanding of the boundary conditions of interfirm 
trust (Poppo et al., 2016). High joint AS augments the strength of joint trust in promoting exchange
performance; by facilitating information sharing and efficient coordination, joint trust enables the 
extensive use of specific assets to create value. Prior studies show that trust can have a stronger 
(Aulakh et al., 1996) or weaker (Poppo et al., 2008) effect on performance when AS is high. Our
findings offer fresh insights: this inconsistency arises not only from the different sides (i.e., buyer 
or supplier) but also from whether buyer and supplier AS is symmetric or not. Facing high supply 
market uncertainty, exchange parties with joint trust can share information quickly and make 
timely adaptations, whereas relationships marked by buyer trust asymmetry suffer more. These 
findings help reconcile contradictory findings regarding supply market uncertainty as a boundary 
condition of trust. Overall, considering both joint and asymmetric trust provides a more complete 
explanation of the role of trust and its boundary conditions. 
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